



What background do individuals who frequent extreme Islamist environments in Norway have prior to their radicalisation?

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- Our survey confirms the existing image of extreme Islamism in Norway as a multi-ethnic phenomenon, composed of young men with a Muslim background, a low level of education, extensive criminal activities and little or no work experience.
- Our survey however uncovers ethnic variations. For instance, Pakistanis and Somalis are underrepresented in relation to the size of these minorities in Norway.
- Certain minorities are overrepresented and will be examined in more detail to clarify whether this is a real overrepresentation or the result of incidental circumstances.
- The converts, who constitute 18% of the individuals in our study, are also overrepresented.
- 73% of the individuals in our survey have entered their radicalisation process after the onset of the Syria conflict.
- 61% of those who become radicalised have immigrated to Norway in their childhood or youth.
- 17,5% have lost one or both parents in the course of their childhood or youth.
- The figures for crime and upper secondary school dropouts, indicate that a large number of the individuals in our study have had a difficult adolescence.
- The survey shows that many may have a weak affiliation to Norway and Norwegian society among other things due to lack of participation in working life.
- Based on the variables we have examined, male travellers to Syria as well as returnees only to some extent differ from men who have not travelled to Syria.
- Because many of those who frequent extreme Islamist environments face social challenges, many of them may be identified through our cooperation with other government services. Based on the findings in our survey, prevention should still be conducted according to our basic principles of crime prevention.
- There is a large potential for radicalisation also in the future, as several youths face the same challenges and problems as the majority of the individuals in our study.
- As there is limited social variation in our study, it is possible that radicalisation also occurs in milieus that are more resourceful than the ones uncovered in our survey, but of which we are unaware.

Background

The prevention of radicalisation¹ into extreme Islamism is a relatively new field, both to security services and social science research. The attacks against the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001 renewed the engagement in this field. These efforts were further intensified after the terrorist attacks in London in 2005.

There is however still a significant lack of empirical studies of radicalisation and this limits our understanding of the phenomenon. The PST has therefore wanted to examine more closely the characteristics of individuals who frequent extreme Islamist environments prior to their radicalisation.

The purpose of this survey is to provide quantitative knowledge to support our analysis of the threat picture as well as our and other services' ability to work preventively. Increased knowledge about who is prone to radicalisation, could contribute to measures that are more purposeful and fewer radicalised individuals.

Problem

Recruitment to extreme Islamism in Europe has been explained among other by the lack of integration of individuals with a Muslim background and subsequent frustration and alienation, social marginalization and identity crisis². As a counter-argument to such an understanding, it has been argued that the number of radicalised individuals should have been far higher in that case, as only a few of those who are poorly integrated become radicalised.³

From our continuous work with threat assessments, we already know that the phenomenon of extreme Islamism in Norway is dominated by young male Muslims with a limited education and work experience, and a criminal record. Findings made in this study confirm this picture. Our study, however, contributes to quantifying the prevalence of these factors, to nuance them and to shed light on other risk factors.

This report describes the background of individuals prior to their radicalisation.⁴ The project examines a representative selection constituted by 137 individuals who have attracted the attention of our service. They have undergone a radicalisation process in *Norway* and are under the age of 40. The selection ranges from those who «only» frequented extreme Islamist environments to individuals who have been involved in terrorist planning or have travelled to Syria. We have examined five main questions:

- Where do they come from?

¹ Radicalisation is defined as the process whereby an individual increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological goals.

² Roy, O. (2004): *Globalized Islam*. Colombia U.P. and Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005): *Islam Rising*. Rowman & Littlefield.

³ EUMC 2006 in Nesser (2011) page 26: *Jihad in Europe – Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behavior, 1995-2010*.

⁴ By «point of radicalisation», we have emphasized a specific year from which we have information that the family, colleagues, civil society, public services, PST or other parties have expressed concern regarding a turning point in which extreme Islamist ideas and/or circle of acquaintances have come to influence the individual's life.

- Which issues were discussed in Norwegian and international debates when they became radicalised?
- How are they vulnerable?
- In what type of criminal activity have they been involved?
- How rooted are they in Norway and in Norwegian society?

The study is based on a representative selection taken from our database. Our database contains information about individuals about whom it has been relevant for us to collect information. The information we may collect is limited by the regulations of the Police Register Act concerning the processing of personal information. These limitations imply that some of the data are imprecise and that others are incomplete. This means that we regard the results as a rough analysis.

Point of radicalisation: The Syria conflict a key factor in Norway

When we compare important debates and events with the point of radicalisation of the individuals included in this study, we see that radicalisation has primarily been triggered by events outside of Norway, but strengthened through the establishment of Salafi networks in Norwegian youth milieus.

The military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the 2000s, where European troops participated, is regarded as the most important reason for the globalisation and intensification of the terrorist threat against Europe.⁵ In Norway, these interventions gave rise to radicalisation among young people and produced the first public exponents of extreme Islamism.

The caricature debate, which started in Denmark in 2006, contributed to the legitimisation of terrorist attacks against Europe.⁶ The debate had a radicalising effect on some Muslims also in Norway. From 2006, Al-Shabaab's activity in Eastern Africa particularly contributed to radicalising certain Norwegian-Somalis in Norway the first years. Israel's warfare on Gaza in 2009 also had a radicalising effect on certain Muslim youths in Norway.

The study also shows a distinct increase in the number of radicalised individuals before and during the Syria conflict. This coincides with the Islamist youth milieu becoming more organised before and during the Syria conflict.

The study shows that no topics or incidents have contributed to radicalising as many as the conflict in Syria has. 73% of the individuals in our study became radicalised after 2011. Among the individuals in the study who have travelled to Syria,⁷ 86% became radicalised after 2011.

⁵ Nesser, P. and Lia, B. (2014) «*Norwegian Muslim Foreign Fighters*», Universitetsforlaget, page 54.

⁶ Nesser, P. and Lia, B. (2014) IBID.

⁷ The individuals we are concerned about are those who travel to Syria and who are suspected of participating in terrorist organizations.

The civilian population's demonstrations against President Assad's regime and the demand for his withdrawal and the instauration of democracy started in November 2011.

Background prior to radicalisation

Men are in majority

As found in other studies of extremism, men also constitute the majority of those included in our study.⁸ Men constitute altogether 88% of our selection. The overrepresentation of men within extreme Islamism is often explained by the fact that extreme Islamism offers men a role: to become a warrior. Returning from a trip referred to as "jihad", also gives recognition and credibility within extreme Islamist milieus.⁹

Before ISIL appeared on the stage, extreme Islamists were less clear about the women's tasks.¹⁰ ISIL has however produced propaganda in which it offers women an active part in the state building process. Starting a family is a contribution to this state building.¹¹ Before the Syria conflict, there were almost no women in the known extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. At present, the women constitute 12% of the individuals in our selection.

They are young

Several studies have shown that political extremism is a phenomenon that in particular attracts young people.¹² This is also true for our study. 65% of the individuals in our selection are under the age of 30. The average age in our study (which only includes individuals under the age of 40) is 27,5 years.

Among those who have *not* travelled to Syria, a higher percentage (35,5%) is above 30 years of age. This indicates that age could be a contributory factor as to why some have not travelled to Syria. To the extent search for identity, action and excitement is a contributory factor both as regards travelling to Syria as well as participating in extreme Islamism in general, these phenomena are known to decrease considerably after the age of 25.¹³

⁸ See for instance (2011): *Jihad in Europe – Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behaviour, 1995-2010*, Bjørge, T. (1997): *Racist and Right Wing Violence in Scandinavia. Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses*. Tano/Aschehoug. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005): *Islam Rising*. Rowman & Littlefield., Rabsa, A. and Benhard, C. (2015): *Eurojihad- Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. Cambridge.

⁹ Alyas Karmani, psychologist, former extreme Islamist who is currently fighting radicalisation in Great Britain. Lecture at the FUUSE conference on 18.09.2015.

¹⁰ Mia Bloom, professor of communication at Georgia State University, to Katharina Montgomery in www.Syriadeeply 08.05.2015: "ISIS recruits Brides to Solve Middle East Marriage Crisis." And Dr. Maleeah Aslam, Indian researcher in a lecture at the Fuuse conference 18.09.2015.

¹¹ Hoyle, C. Bradford, A., Frennet, R. (2015): *Becoming Mulan – female Western Migrants to ISIS*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. And Mia Bloom, professor of communication at Georgia State University, to Katharina Montgomery in www.Syriadeeply 08.05.2015: "ISIS recruits Brides to Solve Middle East Marriage Crisis."

¹² Nesser, P. IBID page 17.

¹³ Steinberg, L. et al. (2008): *Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behaviour and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model*, *Developmental Psychology* Vol. 44, No. 6, 1764-1778.

Kroger, J. Martiniussen, M., Marcia, James E., (2010): Identity Status Change during Adolescence and Young Adulthood: A Meta-Analysis, *Journal of Adolescence* Volume 33, Issue 5, October 2010, Pages 683-698.

The phenomenon is multi-ethnic

Our study confirms that extreme Islamism in Norway is a multi-ethnic phenomenon. The figures from our study nevertheless provide some significant nuances.

88% of the individuals who are included in the study have a different ethnic background than Norwegian or a mixed ethnic background. These individuals are linked to 30 different ethnic groups. Thus, no ethnic affiliation constitutes more than 12% of the selection. The eight largest groups are represented by between 8 and 12%.

Methodically this means that the groups we compare become small when we divide them according to ethnic affiliation. This makes our interpretation of these figures more uncertain than when comparing larger groups in the selection (for instance Syria travellers compared to non-Syria travellers). The ethnic representation nevertheless gives some interesting indications when we compare it with the general population in Norway.

Individuals with Pakistani and Somali backgrounds constitute 10% and 11% of the selection respectively. At the same time, we know that there are about 42 000 individuals of Pakistani origin and 40 000 individuals of Somali origin in Norway.¹⁴ These are the largest Muslim minorities in Norway. This means that, compared to the other ethnic groups in our selection, these are *underrepresented*. The fact that Pakistanis are well integrated in Norway could make them less inclined to become radicalised.¹⁵

Statistics and research confirm that many Somalis experience major challenges in Norwegian society. Many of them have a low income, low level of education and only 36% (30% of the men) are employed.¹⁶ A contributory cause as to why there are so few individuals of Somali background represented in the study could be that the Syria conflict has been less appealing to this group, among other due to their experience from the conflict in Somalia. There is also reason to believe that the security service's and other actors' preventive work among the Somalis also have contributed to reducing the radicalisation.

Individuals of a Bosnian background are also underrepresented as they constitute only 2,5% of the selection. There are altogether 19 000 individuals of Bosnian origin in Norway. We have reason to believe that this reflects the fact that Bosnians in Norway, despite their experience from a (shorter) war and short period of residence, are well integrated in Norway.

Compared to the general population, the study indicates that some of the 30 ethnic affiliations might be overrepresented. The figures are however statistically uncertain and could be the result of coincidences. Being a security service, it is however important for us to examine whether the overrepresentations are due to coincidences or whether preventive efforts are required.

¹⁴ SSB 2016, *Immigrants and Norwegian-born with immigrant parents 1 January 2016*.

¹⁵ Are Skeie Hermansen (2015): *Coming of Age, Getting Ahead? Assessing Socioeconomic Assimilation among Children of Immigrants in Norway*. Doctor's degree work at the Institute of Sociology and Social Geography at the University of Oslo.

¹⁶ Ministry of Labour and Government Administration (2009): *Somalis in Norway - a working group report on page 2, and the statistics «Employment among immigrants, register based 2014, 4th quarter», www.SSB.no.*

The converts are also overrepresented. We have defined «convert» as an individual who has two non-Muslim parents. The converts are considered overrepresented in our study because they constitute 18% of our selection, while there are only around 3000 Muslim converts in Norway.¹⁷

Many are quite vulnerable

As studies of radicalisation in several other European countries have demonstrated, our Norwegian study also shows that many individuals seem to have experienced problems in their lives before the radicalisation process started. Some studies have also shown that such issues are consciously exploited in recruitment processes.¹⁸

61% of the individuals included in our study have immigrated to Norway in their childhood or teens. Only 21% of those with minority background were born and raised in Norway. Those who have immigrated to Norway have had to adapt to Norwegian society in their childhood and youth. When this percentage is so high in our study, we have reason to believe that the situation might have been challenging, and/or that they bring with them difficult life experiences prior to their arrival in Norway.

Countries like France, Belgium and Great Britain are known to have a considerable number of second-generation immigrants in their extreme Islamist milieus. That so many have immigrated in their childhood or teens thus seems to be a specific Norwegian feature. This could be due to the fact that immigration to Norway from countries where Islam plays a prominent role only become a significant phenomenon in the 1970s. The first immigrants were looking for work and came from areas of Pakistan where there were fewer conflicts at the time. This group has become well integrated in Norway. Those who have immigrated these last years, constitute a more mixed group, and many of them have a background from conflict areas. If the integration of these individuals does not succeed, their children are likely to become prone to radicalisation.

Our study also shows that 17,5% of those included in our selection have lost their parents in the course of their childhood or youth. Most of them lost their parents before the age of 10. Based on British figures, we have reason to believe that 3-5% of the remaining Norwegian population between 5 and 15 have lost their parents.¹⁹

The group in our selection, in which individuals have lost their parents, also have a higher score on other variables. 71% of those who have lost their parents in their childhood or youth have immigrated. Those who have lost their parents have a higher score than the average of the study on factors such as *mal adjustment (43%), drug abuse (52%), discontinued or not started upper secondary education (66%), unemployment or no registered work (76%)*. Among those who have lost their parents, there is also a higher number who has travelled to Syria or other conflict areas (67%) than among those who have not lost their parents (42%).

Mental problems, substance abuse and mal adjustment

¹⁷ Islam researcher Kari Vogt (based on expert assessment) in Dagen 08.06.2015 «*Several Norwegians convert to Islam*».

¹⁸ Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005): *Islam Rising*. Rowman & Littlefield.

¹⁹ Fauth, B. and Thompson, M. and Penny, A. (2009): «*Associations between childhood bereavement and children's background, experiences and outcomes. Secondary analysis of the 2004 Mental Health of Children and Young people in Great Britain data.*» This study however also emphasize that the mortality among parents with low socio-economic status would be somewhat higher. It is thus to be expected that it would be a couple of percent higher for the subjects of the radicalisation project than for the rest of the population.

The distribution of mental problems and illnesses are no more prominent among the individuals in the study (21%) than what would be expected in a control group drawn from a comparable segment of the general population. There is, however, reason to believe that the study has hidden figures concerning information about mental problems and illnesses. Most of the individuals in the study come from African and Asian countries, and these minorities are known for their infrequent use of the health service to deal with such problems.

Poor mental health is not in itself regarded as an indicator that someone will participate in terrorist acts, but may strengthen the feeling of being an outsider and not integrated in society, which again seems to be a contributory factor to radicalisation.

As far as substance abuse is concerned, our study shows important differences between the sexes. 43% of the men and only 6% of the women have been involved in substance abuse. Substance abuse is often associated with mental problems and illnesses and could be an indication of the hidden figures we believe exist.

By mal adjustment, we imply that they have had difficulties solving conflicts at school, at work and at home of such a nature that it has been emphasized in our description of this individual. In this respect, male Syria travellers and converts are somewhat overrepresented (38% and 44% respectively), compared to the average in the study of 32%.

Many have a criminal record and a history of violence

Like many studies of radicalisation in other countries, our study also shows that many were involved in criminal activities prior to their radicalisation.²⁰ Again there are however important differences between the sexes. Our study shows that 68% of the men have been suspected of, charged with or sentenced for criminal acts prior to their time of radicalisation, whereas this is only the case for 31% of the women. The majority of the men are registered with relatively many offences in the criminal records. Those who are registered with few offences have been involved in crime of a serious nature.

These findings demonstrate that the phenomenon of extreme Islamism in Norway attracts men with a criminal record. Research on crime has pointed to the fact that many with such a history come from disadvantaged families with a number of social and economic problems.²¹ It is however not possible for us to examine whether this is the case.²² We have reason to believe that such factors are also hidden behind the high figures in our study. This is furthermore emphasized by the fact that as many as 17% of the men (none of the women) were registered with an offence in the criminal records while they were under the age of criminal responsibility (15 years) and that the share increases to 31% before the age of 16.

Our study shows that extreme Islamism in Norway attracts many who do not only have a criminal record, but also a history of violence. The fact that as many as 46% of the men (and only 12% of the women) men have been suspected of, charged with or convicted of violence,

²⁰ Nesser, P. (2011): *Jihad in Europe - Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behaviour, 1995-2010*, Rabsa, A. and Benhard, C. (2015): *Eurojihad- Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. Cambridge. Silber, M.D. and Bhatt, A. NYPD (2007): *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. NYPD Intelligence Division. Unclassified.

²¹ Bjørger, T. (2015): *Prevention of crime*. Universitetsforlaget page 30.

²² PST is only allowed to register information about the services under our scrutiny - not about other individuals such as parents and siblings.

might be a reflection of how extreme Islamist milieus' glorify violence and make room for individuals with such a background. Research indicates that there are hidden figures related to crime in general, but that violence (and sexual offences) are the areas with the highest hidden figures.²³ In addition, it probably influences the figures for the 35% in our study, who are over 30 years old that criminal offences committed by individuals under age often were not registered in the criminal records before 2003.

Our study also shows that 42% of the men (but only 6% of the women) have been involved in drug related crime.

Because extreme Islamism requires the believer to follow strict moral codes, we also wanted to see whether the individuals in our study stopped their criminal activity after their turning point into extreme Islamism. The study shows that it is hard to cease criminal activity even after adopting this conservative religious belief. Our study shows a decrease in criminal activity, but also that so far 52% have been suspected of, charged with or sentenced for criminal acts, after their point of radicalisation.

Affiliation with Norway and Norwegian society

76% of the individuals in the study have a Norwegian citizenship. Extreme Islamism is however an ideology which rejects man-made laws and democracy and legitimizes violence to fight these. We therefore wanted to examine to which extent individuals who frequent extreme Islamist environments have a background which make them well rooted in Norway and in Norwegian society.

We have already seen the high percentage (61%) of individuals who have immigrated in their childhood or teens and how this implies that many of them might have been struggling to adapt to life in Norway in their childhood and/or youth or have brought with them tough experiences from the time prior to their arrival.

The high number of individuals with a criminal record (68%), often from a young age, suggests that many of them might come from troubled families. This is often the case for those who get involved in criminal activities.

Low level of education

Our study also shows that the general level of education is low:

Minimum 47% have not completed or never started upper secondary education, whereas 39% have supposedly completed upper secondary education. The quality of the data makes us believe that the actual number is lower.

²³ IPSOS MMI on a mission for the police in 2015, show that only 54% of those who had been exposed to a criminal act the last year reported the case. See also "Reported crime and criminal treatment 2014 - commented criminal record figures". Police Directorate.

Furthermore, 4% have allegedly started university or college education, but only a few of them have completed their education. These figures are however also very uncertain. Our assessment is that hardly anyone in our study has completed higher education.

Research indicates that the parents' level of education and socio-economic background and not their ethnicity is decisive for whether the education is completed.²⁴ This means that we have reason to believe that many in our selection could have a low socio-economic status and parents with a low level of education.

Other research shows that when pupils' drop out of upper secondary education it is often due to other circumstances than school,²⁵ such as loneliness and lack of relations,²⁶ behaviour problems,²⁷ mental health²⁸ and language problems.²⁹

Research has also shown that when individuals with a higher education have participated in terrorist acts, they have been subjected to discrimination at the place of work and have been employed in unskilled positions or in positions for which they are overqualified.³⁰ This perceived imbalance has been emphasized as a contributory cause as to why individuals with a higher education have participated in the planning and execution of terrorist acts. In Norway, this so far seems to be marginal phenomenon.

Weak affiliation to the work market

The high share of individuals with a sporadic affiliation with working life combined with long periods of unemployment (64%), also contributes to the impression that many individuals have a weak affiliation to Norwegian society. The average convert has had a somewhat more stable affiliation to the work market and there is thus somewhat less unemployment among them than other groups.

Only 4% of the individuals in our study have been employed as skilled workers based on vocational competence. Altogether 14,6% of the individuals in our study have never been registered with work in the Norwegian register of employees. Among the women, the figure is 30%, and 10% among men.

Many Syria travellers

Finally, the large share of Syria travellers (45%) is an indication that quite a few of those who are attracted to extreme Islamism find that they have little to lose by leaving Norway.

²⁴ SSB 2014: «Upper secondary education flow, 2009-2014» and SSB (2014): «Population with immigrant background in 13 municipalities, page 271».

²⁵ www.forskning.no 06092012: «School is not the problem».

²⁶ Mjåvatn, P.E. and Frostad, P. (2014): "Loosing all interest in school: social participation as a predictor of the intention to leave upper secondary school early." NTNU.

²⁷ www.nrk.no 17 January 2014: «Behavioural problems make upper secondary dropouts».

²⁸ Directorate of Education (2014): «Mental health in school». Report.

²⁹ Wollscheid, S. (2010): «Language, incentive and desire to learn – early efforts and measures against dropouts in upper secondary school throughout the entire childhood and adolescence». NOVA.

³⁰ Rabasa, A. and Benhard, C. (2015): *Eurojihad. Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*. Cambridge U.P.

If we look at the male Syria travellers, we see that they differ from men who have *not* left primarily in two respects. Only 14% of the Syria travellers are over 30 years old, whereas 37% of those who are not travelling are over 30 years old. Moreover, the Syria travellers have more often been involved in violence prior to their time of radicalisation (58%) compared to those who do not travel (35%).

The relevance of the study to the assessment of the threat picture

The study shows that the regular Muslim youth or convert is not the one prone to being recruited to extreme Islamism in Norway. Those who are prone to radicalisation are primarily individuals who seem to have had a difficult childhood and youth with mal adjustment, substance abuse and criminal activity. Most of them have little education and are less likely to become employed.

Most likely, this makes it easier for us as a security service to maintain an overview of potential threat actors, since they primarily consist of individuals with a criminal record, dropouts, drug abuse and sporadic participation in the work market. Other government services are responsible for preventing these problems. This means that one or more public services will often be in contact with individuals who are in a radicalisation process. Through continued good cooperation, these services could contribute to uncovering instances of radicalisation so that we together could prevent this individual from developing in a negative direction.

In view of the ethnic affiliation represented in the selection, several aspects are positive for the threat picture. Pakistanis and Somalis, who constitute the largest Muslim minorities in Norway, only constitute a small share of the selection in the study.

The fact that such a large share of our selection has immigrated to Norway in their childhood and teens, possibly also reflects that the integration challenge has become more complex than it was when the first non-Western immigrants came as labour migrants to Norway at the beginning of the 1970s. Lack of integration of new immigrant groups could have an effect on the threat picture in the future.

Most individuals in the study, who have a background from conflict areas (47%), come from countries where the conflict is internal or regional (Chechnya, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). This is also seen as positive for the Norwegian threat picture. If we for instance compare ourselves to France and Great Britain, these countries have large groups of immigrants from conflict areas where these European countries are part of the enemy image (North Africa and Kashmir respectively), and where this is a considerable force in the radicalisation of young Muslims.

In our study, men who have been suspected of, charged with or sentenced for criminal acts, constitute 68%. This is negative to the threat picture when this contributes to increasing their capacity. They might have a lower threshold for carrying out criminal acts, have criminal

contacts who can contribute with weapons and illegal chemicals, have a lower threshold for violence, as well as the experience gained from committing criminal acts.

It is potentially negative for the long-term threat picture that a large number of men with a background from Norway have now been on jihad trips. Radicalisation and recruitment to extreme Islamism in Great Britain in the 2000s showed that such experience has provided recruiters to extreme Islamism with substantial credibility.³¹ So far, this does not seem to be the case in Norway and will most likely only be visible in the future.

It is however positive for the threat picture that there has been a *decrease* in the number of Syria travellers. This decline is likely due to the fact that ISIL is under a strong pressure and that ISIL warriors are losing their motivation.

The empirical data of the study can however not yet establish whether there are more or fewer who become radicalised among those who frequent extreme Islamist milieus, but who do not travel to Syria.

There is a large recruitment potential because there are many young people in the Muslim population with the same problems as the majority within our study. In the intermediate term, there is an even bigger recruitment potential if the children of the present immigrants are not better integrated in the education system and in the work market.

Studies from other countries have concluded that individuals, who are being recruited to extreme Islamism, reflect a great variation in social background, and that anyone can be recruited and radicalised. Our study indicates that the background of those who frequent these environments in Norway do not vary very much at present. This however raises the question of whether this is the full Norwegian picture, or whether radicalisation also occurs in more resourceful environments, of which we are unaware.

³¹ See for instance O'Neill & Daniel McGrory: *The suicide Factory*, Harper Perennial, 2006 and Melanie Philips: *Londonistan. How Britain created a Terror State within*. Gibson Square.